BRIAN MICHAELS, ESQ.
259 East Fifth Avenue
Eugene, Oregon 97401
(541) 687-0578
Attorney For Plaintiffs Adams and Michaels

REED LEE
J.D. Obenberger & Associates
Attorneys & Counselors-at-Law
Three First National Plaza, Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 558-6420
Attorney for Plaintiffs Black, Newbre,
Johnson, and Bernstein

MARIANNE DUGAN (OSB # 93256)
1216 Lincoln Street
Eugene, OR 97401
(541) 485-2471
Local Counsel for Plaintiffs Black, Newbre,
Johnson, and Bernstein

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ALEXIS BLACK, BRIAN MICHAELS, )
BARRY ADAMS, CARLA NEWBRE, JOHN )
JOHNSON, and SUSAN BERNSTEIN, ) CIVIL NO. 97-1798-AA
)
Plaintiffs, ) SECOND AMENDED
) COMPLAINT
v. )
)
RUSSEL ARTHUR, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)

NOW COME the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned case, Alexis Black, Brian Michaels, Barry Adams, Carla Newbre, Bruce (John) Johnson, and Susan Bernstein, and complain against the Defendants, Russel Arthur, in his official capacity only, John Carpenter, in his official capacity only, and the United States Forest Service, as follows:

Nature of the Action

1. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants concerning the enforcement of an administrative regulation which requires that an authorization for any temporary "non-commercial group use" of any National Forest lands be signed not only by the government official issuing the authorization but also by an individual designated and authorized to sign the authorization on behalf of the holder thereof.

a. This signature requirement was and is targeted at the Plaintiffs and others who have in the past and who will in the future gather on National Forest land to pray and exchange their views. The challenged signature requirement was designed effectively to prevent these gatherings, and it has been repeatedly used to trigger law enforcement activities which have invaded and disrupted the peace and dignity of the gatherings, particularly the sanctity of religious activities.

b. To the extent that it was validly promulgated and to the extent that it applies to Plaintiffs gathering at all, the challenged signature requirement imposes, for the reasons detailed infra, an unconstitutional prior restraint upon Plaintiffs' expression and religious exercise which are presumptively protected by the Constitution of the United States.

c. The challenged signature requirement is not narrowly tailored to serve any significant government interest, but is tailored to serve only impermissible government interests. All legitimate governmental interests can be fully protected by means, some of which the Forest Service has itself used in the past, which impose significantly less chill upon the willingness of Plaintiffs and others to gather in National Forests to exercise religion and exchange views.

2. Each of the Plaintiffs regularly gathers with others in the National Forests in order to, inter alia, practice his or her religion and develop, express, and exchange his or her views with other gatherers.

3. This action arises under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, under Sections 553, 702, 703, and 706 of Title 5 of the United States Code, and under Sections 1651, 2201, 2202, and 2412 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

Jurisdiction and Venue

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy under Sections 553, 702, 703, and 706 of Title 5 of the United States Code, and under Sections 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

5. Venue is proper in this District under Section 1391(b) and (e) of Title 28 of the United States Code because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims occurred within the District of Oregon.

PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Alexis Black ("Black") has been attending "Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, for twenty years. She attended the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon. Prior to and during that gathering, Plaintiff Black worked with Forest Service resource management personnel and with local business, civic, and community organizations in order to prepare for the gathering, help to provide for the needs of gatherers, help to prevent adverse impacts by the gathering upon surrounding communities, and help promote understanding of gatherings on the part of people living and working in the area. For this, Ms. Black was threatened by Defendants with a criminal citation. Ms. Black's son was involved in earlier stages of discussions with Forest Service personnel, and soon thereafter suddenly passed away. Long before Ms. Black was threatened, the Forest Service was aware of her loss. It was because of this loss Defendants were persuaded to cite another person, and that person was Plaintiff Barry Adams. Plaintiff Black intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings," throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and she fears she will again be threatened with citation or arrest if she attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for a noncommercial group use.

7. Plaintiff Brian Michaels ("Michaels") is an attorney who has been attending "Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, for approximately twenty years. At the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon, Plaintiff Michaels was cited by Defendant Russel Arthur and a law enforcement team for violating a Forest Service administrative regulation, 36 CFR 261.10(k), by gathering on Forest Service land with more than 74 other persons without any one of those persons attending having signed an authorization on behalf of the larger group. Plaintiff Michaels has been an attorney for the last several years, and in his capacity as an attorney, he represented in November, 1996, among other instances, one of five individuals similarly cited by the Forest Service for attending a smaller local regional "Rainbow Gathering" in North Carolina June of 1996. Plaintiff Michaels intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings," throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and he fears he will again be cited or arrested if he attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for noncommercial group use. In addition, Plaintiff Michaels will likely continue to represent individuals whose rights to attend events similarly designed and termed "Rainbow Gatherings" are threatened by Court action; and he intends to continue doing so well into the future.

8. Plaintiff Barry Adams ("Adams") has been a well-known active and outspoken participant in "Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, since their inception. He continues to attend them presently, and he fully intends to continue doing so into the future. He attended the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon, and was there cited by Defendant Russel Arthur and a law enforcement team for violating a Forest Service administrative regulation, 36 CFR 261.10(k), by gathering on Forest Service land with more than 74 other persons without any one of those persons attending having signed an authorization on behalf of the larger group. Plaintiff Adams intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings," throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and he fears he will again be cited or arrested if he attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for a noncommercial group use.

9. Plaintiff Carla Newbre ("Newbre") has been attending "Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, for eighteen years. She attended the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon. As a resident of Oregon, Plaintiff Newbre participated in early efforts with regional Forest Service Administrative and Resource personnel in order to insure a safe and healthy event. She continued to communicate with these persons and with members of the Incident Command Team, until she received a citation for illegal occupancy of National Forest lands. Ms. Newbre was also part of a group of individuals who contacted local business, civic, community organizations, and social service agencies in Prineville, Oregon in order to prepare for the gathering, help to provide for needs of gatherers, help to prevent adverse impacts by gathering on surrounding communities, and help to promote understanding of gatherings on the part of people living and working in the area. During one of these visits Ms. Newbre along with Ms. Alexis Black and Ms. Susan Bernstein, visited the Forest Service Command Post and was introduced to Defendant Carpenter. As a result of these activities, Plaintiff Newbre was cited at the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" by Defendant Russel Arthur and a law enforcement team for violating a Forest Service administrative regulation, 36 CFR 261.10(k), by gathering on Forest Service land with more than 74 other persons without any one of those persons attending having signed an authorization on behalf of the larger group. Plaintiff Newbre intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings," throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and she fears she will again be cited or arrested if she attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for a noncommercial group use.

10. Plaintiff Bruce Johnson ("Johnson") has been attending "Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, for twenty-five years. He has been active during gatherings in resolving disputes and problems arising among gatherers and in conferring and communicating with local and federal personnel, including Forest Service law enforcement personnel, concerning issues arising during gatherings. Plaintiff Johnson attended the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon. As a result of his long-standing activities in keeping the peace and resolving both internal and external disputes, Plaintiff Johnson was threatened at the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" with a citation for violating a Forest Service administrative regulation, but he was not cited because he happened to be away from the gathering site when citations were issued. Plaintiff Johnson intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings," throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and he fears he will again be threatened with citation or arrest if he attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for a noncommercial group use.

11. Plaintiff Susan Bernstein ("Bernstein") has been involved in helping the "Annual Rainbow Gatherings," as described infra, occur for more than a decade. She attended the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" held in the Ochoco National Forest within the District of Oregon. She volunteered with Welcome Home Center at that gathering and she met with local resident, civic, religious, and business groups to facilitate a more friendly environment for the gathering. As a result of these activities, Plaintiff Bernstein was cited at the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" by Defendant Russel Arthur and a law enforcement team for violating a Forest Service administrative regulation, 36 CFR 261.10(k), by gathering on Forest Service land with more than 74 other persons without any one of those persons attending having signed an authorization on behalf of the larger group. Plaintiff Bernstein intends to continue attending "Rainbow Gatherings" throughout the United States, including in the District of Oregon, and she fears she will again be cited or arrested if she attends a gathering for which the Forest Service has not issued an authorization for noncommercial group use.

12. Defendant Russel Arthur ("Arthur") is a law enforcement officer employed by Defendant Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. He ordinarily operates in North Carolina, but Defendant Arthur was specially assigned to Oregon to oversee law enforcement surrounding the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering." Defendant Arthur was previously involved with supervising law enforcement activities surrounding the 1987 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" which occurred in North Carolina as well as smaller local and regional similar events in North Carolina, including that which resulted in the Federal Court action wherein Plaintiff Michaels successfully represented a Defendant November of 1996. Between 1987 and present, Defendant Arthur has retained a keen personal and law enforcement interest in "Rainbow Gatherings," in the Forest Service's administrative regulations regarding expressive and recreational uses of National Forest lands, and in all legal actions involving the imposition of regulations upon those who attend "Rainbow Gatherings." On information and belief, Defendant Arthur's professional and personal attitude toward the on-going "Rainbow Gatherings" is somewhat less than favorable or supportive.

13. Defendant John Carpenter ("Carpenter") is a special agent law enforcement officer employed by Defendant Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. He was assigned to duties involving "Rainbow Gatherings" for the first time in 1995 in New Mexico. The 1997 Oregon Rainbow Gathering elevated Mr. Carpenter to Chief LEO status in charge of implementing, among other duties, the Group Use Regulations. In particular, Defendant Carpenter's assignment included enforcement of the signature requirement challenged here, and responsible for Daily Incident Action Plan, which was kept secret from the Incident Command Structure.

14. Defendant Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USFS") is a federal administrative agency within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code. It is charged by statute and administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to Section 551 of Title 16 of the United States Code with the administration, governance, regulation and operation of the National Forest Service System, including all portions of the Ochoco National Forest. Under this authority, the USFS has established a law enforcement branch which conducts ordinary and extraordinary law enforcement activities, and which, since 1996, acts with complete independence from local USFS resource management personnel. Unless restrained by this Court, the USFS will continue its efforts to enforce the signature requirement challenged here, and the law enforcement branch will continue, in substantial part under the color of the challenged signature requirement, to maintain an excessive and oppressive presence at "Rainbow Gatherings," continuing to unnecessarily arrest individuals, to chill the exercise of their rights by those not arrested, to unnecessarily destroy the sanctity of religious ceremonies, and to otherwise destroy, threaten, and intimidate the expressive exchanges as well as ingress and egress presumptively protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

15. Since 1972, many persons have from time to time, gathered in areas remote from highly developed urban areas where those attending these "Rainbow Gatherings" can join with one another to pray for peace, discuss environmental and other contemporary political and social issues and concerns, and exchange, develop, express, and demonstrate their ideas and views. These gatherings are traditionally held within National Forests because of the gatherers' belief in the importance of public land as a public forum. The location of these gatherings on National Forest land also strongly promotes the religious interest of many gatherers in joining with others of similar beliefs on public lands in common religious ceremonies and practices.

16. An "Annual Rainbow Gathering" has occurred on and around July 4 in every year since 1972. In recent years, these annual gatherings have attracted more than 20,000 people to each gathering. In addition, there have been numerous additional gatherings, often referred to as "Regional Rainbow Gatherings," which occur in National Forests throughout the United States and at different times of the year. These gatherings are generally smaller than the "Annual Rainbow Gatherings," but they regularly draw 75 or more gatherers. These regional gatherings enable many persons who lack the resources to travel to the more distant annual gatherings to participate in the religious ceremonies and social, environmental, and political exchanges which characterize "Rainbow Gatherings." At all of these gatherings, gatherers, like Plaintiffs, who regularly return to gatherings time after time have developed and carry on voluntary religious ceremonies and traditions and have created and implemented methods for conducting other voluntary common activities and for serving the human needs of the gatherers during gatherings. In the absence of USFS regulations which effectively prohibit "Rainbow Gatherings" or which effectively chill the willingness of the gatherers to attend these annual and regional gatherings will continue in National Forests throughout the United States, including Oregon, for the foreseeable future.

17. What Defendant USFS calls "The Rainbow Family" is in fact nothing more than a temporary collection of gatherers. It is not incorporated or registered in any form or forum under any laws, and it is not a membership organization. In jurisdictions such as Oregon, it has no legal authority to appoint agents for itself as an entity or to enter into contracts which generally bind gatherers or other supporters. It lacks an on-going central leadership and does not have or claim the authority to discipline gatherers or to make decisions and commitments as an agent. It has successfully and consistently resisted any notion of an organized governing structure to bind or direct any of the gatherers. It is in deed the only unifying force among those attending, including each Plaintiff, that there be no such structure. This general lack of any centralized internal structure results not from an inability to organize individuals but rather from the gatherers' religious and profound social and political beliefs concerning the absence of any formalized structure when they gather. In keeping with these beliefs, "Rainbow Gatherings" operate as participatory events on the basis of voluntary cooperation and peaceful respect. Adherence to this very ideal is objectionable to Defendants and the underlying basis for the designed punishment of these Plaintiffs.

18. There has been since the first "Rainbow Gathering" a growing division of attitude within the Forest Service toward this First Amendment activity on Forest Service lands. The Resource management division which oversees environmental impact, health and safety management, and land reclamation has consistently grown more and more favorable toward the continuation of these gatherings while Law Enforcement and other political branches have grown more and more hostile. USFS has long recognized the remarkable success of the "Rainbow Gatherings." On information and belief, the Forest Service has for many years regularly prepared or authorized the preparation of reports, known at least informally as "Rainbow Reports," which document the overall success of the gatherings and of the often informal cooperative efforts between USFS resource management personnel and gatherers. With only one exception- which was itself caused or seriously exacerbated by the unwillingness of the USFS law enforcement personnel to permit the gatherers to implement or follow through with methods which they have developed to set up, operate, or clean up after gatherings- the "Rainbow Gatherings" have occurred and continue to occur without endangering the health and safety of the gatherers or others, or interfering with other authorized activities in the National Forests, or any lasting adverse impact to National Forest lands. A substantial number of committed gatherers, for instance, regularly remain after a gathering to clean up National Forest lands and to restore them to their pristine state by taking recognized steps to repair any impact the temporary presence of large number of gatherers may have had upon the land.

19. "Rainbow Family" gatherers have always been willing to cooperate with resource management personnel from USFS in their development of an "Operating Plan" concerning location of resources, timing and conduct of gathering activities, and clean up and restoration of National Forest lands after a gathering. So successful has the Operating Plan concept has been in the past, in 1983 the Forest Service proposed and in 1984 so passed a Group Use Regulation incorporating the Operating Plan as a viable option for Group use management. Only after having lost two court cases initiated by Forest Service Law Enforcement on other aspects of this particular group use did the Forest Service promulgate the current Group Use Regulation devoid of any Operating Plan alternative channel of communication. Having had the Group Use regulations thrown out as unconstitutional in 1988 by Federal District Court Judge William Justice, the Forest Service was without a group use regulation. Throughout that entire time, each year this particular group use was held on National Forest land, an Operation Plan was utilized to the successful satisfaction of the Forest Service. Excluding the Operating Plan as an alternative avenue of communication from the current version of the group use regulations is motivated by impermissible political considerations, and not by any furtherance of legitimate governmental interests.

20. After its prior regulations governing authorizations for expressive and religious activities in the National Forests were invalidated as a result of litigation involving "Rainbow Gatherings," USFS proposed and promulgated its current administrative regulations which it has enforced and continues to enforce against "Rainbow Gatherings" and those who attend them. In particular, on August 30, 1995, USFS amended Subpart B of Part 251 of its administrative regulations concerning National Forests. Part 251 generally regulates land uses in the National Forests and Subpart B thereof contains regulations which specifically apply to so-called "Special Uses" of National Forest land. As amended, administrative regulations now distinguish between commercial uses and noncommercial special uses. "Rainbow Gatherings" are and have always been wholly noncommercial in nature, even to the extent that gatherers virtually uniformly refrain from the use or exchange of money at gathering sites. Furthermore, USFS has never suggested that its regulations concerning commercial special uses apply to "Rainbow Gatherings," and it has never threatened Plaintiffs or any other gatherers with enforcement of its administrative regulations concerning commercial special uses. With respect to noncommercial special uses, Section 251.50(c) of the current USFS administrative regulations generally leaves all such uses unregulated by any prior permit or authorization requirement unless noncommercial use is also a "group use," which is defined in Section 251.51 as "an activity conducted on National Forest System lands that involves a group of 75 or more people, either as participants or spectators."

21. With respect to noncommercial group uses, Section 251.54(e)(1) and (2) require an application for special use authorization be made in advance, and Section 251.54(h) governs the issuance of authorizations for such special uses. The current USFS regulations expressly provide that individuals may apply for special use authorizations, and they nowhere prohibit an individual from applying for a permit for noncommercial group use authorization. Similarly, the existing administrative regulations nowhere expressly prohibit the issuance of an authorization for noncommercial group use to an individual. While the current USFS regulations do not require anyone sign an application for noncommercial group use authorization, Section 251.54(e)(2)(i)(E) does require the application specify "[t]he name of the person or persons 21 years of age or older who will sign a special use authorization on behalf of the applicant." Similarly, Section 251.54(h)(1)(viii) requires issuance of noncommercial group use authorization only upon a determination that "[a] person or persons 21 years of age or older have been designated to sign and do sign a special use authorization on behalf of the applicant." Thus the current USFS administrative regulations require that the authorization itself, but not the application, be signed by or on behalf of the applicant. Beyond this, Section 251.54(2) purports to permit an effective denial of a noncommercial group use authorization for an expressive or religious activity, such as an "Annual Rainbow Gathering" or one of the numerous "Regional Rainbow Gatherings," by administrative action alone, even if the USFS or the United States does not go to court to restrain such a use. Furthermore, Sections 251.54(f)(5) and 251.60(a)(1)(i) expressly permit revocation of a noncommercial group use authorization for an expressive or religious activity, such as a "Rainbow Gathering," for any reason which would have supported a denial under 251.54(h)(1), even if the authorization had been granted by operation of law because the authorized officer failed to comply with the specified deadline for a decision on an application for such a noncommercial group use authorization.

22. Since the USFS promulgated its current administrative regulations it has repeatedly attempted to enforce against "Rainbow Gatherings" and individual attendees at "Rainbow Gatherings," including Plaintiffs, the requirement that noncommercial group uses obtain a special use authorization under Section 251.54. It has done so by attempting to sue certain gatherers in a civil action, by ticketing carefully selected gatherers who appear at gatherings which lack such authorization, and, beginning in the Spring or Summer of 1996, by repeatedly pressuring certain prospective gathering attendees to sign applications or authorizations for noncommercial group use. In fact, USFS has, through its resource management and law enforcement personnel, pressured individuals to sign applications and, on information and belief, authorizations for noncommercial group uses in the name of the "Rainbow Family" or some clearly equivalent reference, even though said USFS personnel knew and should have known that the individuals with whom they were dealing had no authority to bind the "Rainbow Family" or any other gatherer. During the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering," for instance, the USFS, on information and belief, ultimately satisfied itself with a signature on an application and/or an authorization, of an individual who had little if anything to do with any preparations for that gathering, who briefly attended that gathering, and who then promptly left that gathering site to return to her home over one hundred miles away, and who thereafter had no further dealings whatsoever with that or any other gathering. Furthermore, on information and belief, the USFS has purported to add specifications, restrictions, and burdens by language appearing on the noncommercial group use authorizations which it has prepared for signature which specifications, restrictions, and burdens are not expressly authorized by the administrative regulations governing issuance of such noncommercial group use authorizations and which have the effect of seriously chilling the willingness of reasonable individuals to attend or take an active role in any "Rainbow Gathering."

23. During the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering," Defendants Arthur and Carpenter issued citations to Plaintiffs Michaels, Adams, Newbre, and Bernstein requiring them to appear before the United States District Court on unusually short notice, and at a time which each Defendant knew would require the cited Plaintiffs to interrupt their attendance at that gathering. Each Defendant knew the citations as issued would require cited Plaintiffs to interrupt the exercise of their religious and expressive rights, and, on information and belief, intended the first court appearance by cited Plaintiffs to interfere with the on-going gathering. Shortly after the 1997 "Annual Rainbow Gathering" ended, Defendant USFS and the United States dismissed all charges against Plaintiffs Michaels, Adams, Newbre, and Bernstein in connection with the citations which were issued to them during that gathering, and that litigation resulted in no findings, legal conclusions, or judgment of any kind because the government chose not to litigate the filed Motions to Dismiss.

24. These Plaintiffs were cited in 1997 by Law Enforcement Officers against the wishes and recommendations of the resource management team. Mr Mike Lowery, head of the Resource management team, was in fact Incident Commander over Law Enforcement as well until he recommended to not cite individuals because all legitimate government interests as far as he and his team could determine were progressing successfully. Enforcement of unnecessary regulations would only serve to hinder the peace, dignity and freedom of this event. Both the attendees and the resource management team sought to utilize an agreement termed an Operation Plan, not requiring a signature, which has been successfully utilized in the past by this so-called group use. Only Law Enforcement objected. The Operating plan drafted between these parties was eventually incorporated into the "signed Group Use Authorization" as the entire text used to identify each and every Resource concern.

25. Each and every year the Forest Service prepares a report on this First Amendment activity to identify and assess impact, health, sanitation, clean up, and reclamation, and each year these Reports have reflected high praise for the responsibility this group demonstrates for these Governmental interests, with the sole exception of North Carolina 1987 wherein Forest Service Law Enforcement directives created a hostile relationship by carrying out a plan to disrupt, interfere with, molest and arrest the mantels and instruments in place to satisfy the very government interests the Forest Service is itself charged with protecting. These directives had as their consequence, separate and distinct from any government interest, a political objective against this activity because of disagreement with its modus operandi, and thereby its freedoms of speech and assembly. In much the same way, these Plaintiffs experienced Law Enforcement disagreement with the manner in which these Plaintiffs chose to meet with and discuss with other individuals religious, political, and social issues. On information and belief the Resource Management team in 1997 agrees that the issuance of citations and the pursuit of a signature was unnecessary and seemingly politically motivated.

26. The authorization was signed by one woman whose name is uncertain because the Forest Service refused to provide to those attending the Rainbow Gathering a copy of the signed Permit with the signature and name of the signatory. This woman signed the Application and the Permit after being told by the Forest Service (Mr. Arthur) the National Guard would be called out to shut the Gathering down. The signator signed the Application on her way out of the Gathering to Portland. She signed the Permit itself while in Portland. There is no way the Forest Service can claim the need to have a designated representative with whom to address problems, concerns, emergencies, etc can be met by someone who is not on site, not in the area, and who has little knowledge if any of the many details involved in a group assembly of this size. Additionally, the Forest Service had her sign a document on behalf of the whole group when they were in full knowledge that she was not designated to sign on anyone's behalf.

27. Contrary to the language referenced above, the Forest Service has consistently pressured individuals into signing on behalf of an activity and the participants and spectators, and/or penalized individuals for not having done so. Plaintiffs were each penalized for not having an authorized person to sign a Permit on their behalf or for refusing to sign on behalf of others. At all times during the 1997 event wherein Plaintiffs were penalized, Defendants knew or should have known the individuals with whom they were dealing had no authority to bind any other individuals at that activity. Additionally, Defendants have contained within the Application and Special Use Authorization language adding specifications, restrictions, liabilities, and burdens to the signatory, not authorized by the relevant Regulations, and which have the effect of seriously chilling the willingness of reasonable individuals to attend or take an active role in any subject activity.

28. The citations issued against these Plaintiffs had the desired effect of limiting their enjoyment and participation in this First Amendment activity, to further curb and chill other individuals from their enjoyment of this First Amendment activity, by drawing them in to the folds of the federal criminal justice system. The citations were then dismissed by the government rather than litigating the filed Motions to Dismiss.

Count I - Scope of Noncommercial "Group Use"

29. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 of this complaint into this count 1 as if fully restated herein.

30. Under Section 251.50(c), with certain special exceptions not applicable here, a noncommercial use of National Forest land does not require any prior authorization from Defendant USFS unless it qualifies under Section 251.50(c)(3) as a "group use" as defined by Section 251.51. The definition of "group use" contained in Section 251.51 is expressly and carefully restricted to "an activity conducted on National Forest System lands that involves a group of 75 or more people, either as participants or spectators." (Emphasis added).

31. Use of the term "a group of" in the applicable definition is not surplusage but indicates Defendant USFS deliberately restricted the definition of "group use" to those uses which involve "a group" with established internal authority relationships in addition to a specified minimum number of participants and spectators. Furthermore, the avowed purpose of the challenged requirement of a signature by or on behalf of the applicant on the special use authorization itself, rather than on the application of such authorization, makes sense and passes Constitutional muster only if its application is limited to "a group" which has sufficient internal structure and legal authority to bind its members and to be legally liable for their actions or omissions. The Defendant USFS expressly stated, in promulgating the challenged signature requirement, that "[b]y signing a special use authorization on behalf of the group, the agent or representative . . . subjects the group to the authorization's terms and conditions."60 Fed. Reg. 45286 (Aug. 30, 1995). This justification therein excludes a form of first amendment speech outside any evil the Regulations are otherwise empowered to prevent.

32. Since, as alleged in paragraph 17 of this complaint, the "Rainbow Family" is not such an organization under common law applicable here, and since USFS regulations do not purport to be an independent source of legal authority relationships among users of National Forest land, the "Rainbow Family" is not "a group" as that term is used as a necessary part of the definition of "group use" in Section 251.51. For reasons specified in paragraph 31 of this count, "Rainbow Gatherings" fall not within administrative regulation's meaning of "group use" but rather within the broader definition of (non-group) noncommercial uses which, under Section 251.50(c) require no advance authorization at all before commencing and continuing in any National Forest.

33. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants, and each of them, will continue to enforce against Plaintiffs and those with whom they gather a requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be issued by Defendant USFS before any "Rainbow Gathering" can occur on National Forest land. Against these continuing enforcement efforts, Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and are entitled to equitable relief from this Court.

WHEREFORE each Plaintiffs respectfully requests this Court award to them and against each Defendant:

A. Declaratory Judgment that Defendant USFS's administrative regulations governing noncommercial group uses do not apply to what USFS refers to as "Rainbow Gatherings" or to Plaintiffs and other individuals with whom they engage in expression or religious worship when attending any event with insufficient internal structure or legal authority to bind its attendees; and

B. A permanent, and if necessary, a temporary and preliminary, injunction restraining each Defendant and other officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys of Defendant USFS, and others acting in concert with any Defendant, from enforcing, in any manner, including but not limited to issuing citations or arresting Plaintiffs or others, any requirement noncommercial group use authorization be issued by USFS prior to commencement or during the conduct of any event as described in Sub A above; and

C. Their costs in this litigation together with their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 2412(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and

D. Such other and further relief on their behalf as this Court shall deem just and proper.

Count II - Time, Place and Manner Scrutiny

34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 of this complaint into this Count II as if fully restated herein.

35. The administrative regulations promulgated by Defendant USFS to regulate noncommercial groups uses on National Forest lands were deliberately designed as a regulation of time, place, and manner in which presumptively protected expression and religious practice can occur in National Forests, which have historically provided a public forum for both expression and religious worship. Such time, place, and manner restrictions upon expression and religious practice in a public forum are constitutionally permissible if, but only if, they are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.

36. The requirement an individual be designated to sign and the designated actually sign a special use authorization, as opposed to an application for such an authorization, is not narrowly tailored to any legitimate governmental objective but, in fact, directly serves only an illegitimate governmental purpose. In the first place, the challenged signature requirement differs from the typical time, place, and manner restriction implemented by a form of permit requirement in that the typical permit requirement requires an applicant sign the application for the permit or authorization and then provides that the licensing official sign the permit or authorization itself. Even where the government legitimately concludes that the signature of a licensing official is necessary to give the authorization legal effect, no proper governmental interest requires that an applicant also sign it before it take effect. In light of the illegitimate purposes, described paragraph 37 of this count, promoted by a requirement that the authorization also be signed by or on behalf of the applicant or holder, that requirement imposes a substantial chill upon the willingness of potential applicants to use the authorization process.

37. The requirement that the authorization itself be signed by or on behalf of applicant was expressly intended by Defendant USFS to serve an objective which is not a legitimate purpose in regulating time, place, and manner of expression or religious worship. Defendant USFS expressly stated, in promulgating the challenged signature requirement, that "[b]y signing a special use authorization on behalf of the group, agent or representative . . . subjects the group to the authorization's terms and conditions." 60 Fed. Reg. 45286 (Aug. 30, 1995). If the "terms and conditions" contained in the authorization are only those otherwise imposed by law, of course, no signature by or on behalf of applicant is in any way necessary for their enforcement. If limitations, either direct or indirect, on expression or religious worship are otherwise legally proper, then Defendant USFS can enforce those limitations even without consent of applicant. The only meaningful purpose behind the USFS's justification is to enable imposition of additional restrictions, limitations, or requirements not otherwise imposed or authorized by law. The only purpose uniquely served by a requirement for a signature on noncommercial special use authorization itself is an illegitimate purpose, which strongly chills the willingness of potential speakers and worshippers to use National Forest lands.

38. For reasons specified in paragraphs 36 and 37 of this Count, the requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant is not narrowly tailored to serve any legitimate governmental objective which could not be served by substantially less burdensome requirements. This challenged signature requirement thus violates the rights of Plaintiffs secured to them by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is, for that reason void and unenforceable.

39. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to attempt to enforce against Plaintiffs, and those with whom they gather, a requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant before it can be issued by Defendant USFS to authorize any "Rainbow Gathering" on National Forest land. Against these continuing enforcement efforts, the Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and are entitled to equitable relief from this Court.

WHEREFORE each of the Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court award to them and against each of the Defendants:

A. A declaratory judgment that Defendant USFS' administrative regulations requiring a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant before it can be issued is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and it is, for that reason, void and unenforceable; and

B. A permanent, and if necessary a temporary and preliminary, injunction restraining each Defendant and other officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys of Defendant USFS, and others acting in concert with any Defendants, from enforcing, in any manner, including but not limited to issuing citations or arresting Plaintiffs or others, any requirement a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant before it can be issued or an application for such an authorization designate a person or persons who will sign such an authorization by or on behalf of applicant; and

C. Their costs in this litigation together with their reasonable attorneys' fee pursuant to Section 2412(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and

D. Such other and further relief on their behalf as this Court shall deem just and proper.

Count III - Prior Restraint Scrutiny

40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 of this complaint into this count 3 as if fully restated herein.

41. The administrative regulations promulgated by Defendant USFS to regulate noncommercial groups uses on National Forest lands were deliberately designed to require special USFS authorization be obtained before presumptively protected expression and religious practice can occur in National Forests, which have historically provided a public forum for both expression and religious worship. Such a requirement of prior authorization imposes a system of prior restraint upon expression and religious worship. Such systems of prior restraint bear a heavy presumption against their constitutionality and are constitutional if, but only if, they contain express substantive and procedural standards to insure officials charged with considering applications for authorizations will not deny them upon constitutionally improper grounds, such as an effort to suppress a distasteful viewpoint or form of worship or the expression or religious practices of a disfavored speaker or worshiper. Systems of prior restraint lacking such substantive and procedural safeguards are facially unconstitutional, and a potential speaker or worshipper may ignore the prior permission requirement and engage with impunity in the protected expression or religious exercise for which the law purports to require a license. Similarly, one confronted by a facially unconstitutional prior restraint may challenge it notwithstanding the fact challenger never sought permission which is purportedly required.

42. The requirement a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant, in addition to the issuing official effectively defeats substantive standards which Defendant USFS is required to provide for its prior restraint system. To the extent it is supported by any governmental objective at all, this requirement permits USFS or authorized officer to impose otherwise inapplicable and wholly unspecified vicarious liabilities upon applicant or holder of such an authorization. Defendant USFS expressly stated, in promulgating the challenged signature requirement, that "[b]y signing a special use authorization on behalf of the group, agent or representative . . . subjects the group to the authorization's terms and conditions." 60 Fed. Reg. 45286 (Aug. 30, 1995). Yet regulations governing noncommercial group use authorizations nowhere specify, restrict, or limit the sorts of conditions which may be contained in the authorization and which must thus be accepted by applicant before authorization can be issued. This permits the authorized official to do, by indirection, what he or she could not do directly or through the decision to grant or deny an authorization. It ultimately makes little difference to a speaker or worshipper if an application for an authorization is denied for a constitutionally impermissible reason or issued conditioned upon a constitutionally impermissible restriction which applicant must accept by signing the authorization. Indeed, it is just this possibility that a licensing official can achieve a constitutionally impermissible result indirectly, that requires a prior restraint system to contain strict substantive standards in the first place. Concerns about inappropriate vicarious liability, in fact, have a serious chilling effect on the willingness of individuals, such as Plaintiffs, for religious or expressive purposes to gather on National Forest lands and the failure of Defendant USFS to specify the vicarious liability it seeks to impose through the challenged signature requirement, very seriously exacerbates this chilling effect. This chilling effect has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of the USFS' system of prior restraint because it can be controlled on a case-by-case basis by authorized officials who remain free to alter and adjust terms and conditions contained in the authorization on the basis of their view of applicant or applicant's viewpoint.

43. The ability of Defendant USFS and its authorized officials, under Sections 251.54(f)(5) and 251.60(a)(1)(i), to revoke a noncommercial group use authorization for an expressive or religious activity, such as a "Rainbow Gathering," for any reason which would have supported a denial under 251.54(h)(1), even if authorization had been granted by operation of law because the authorized officer failed to comply with specified deadline for a decision on an application, for such an authorization seriously undercuts the procedural standards which the Defendant USFS is required to provide for its prior restraint system. The provision of Section 251.54(f)(5) that a noncommercial group use authorization not denied within the specified time period is automatically granted quite properly serves to provide genuine force and effect to procedural standards which must be in place to prevent licensing officials from achieving by inaction what they cannot achieve directly or through a licensing decision. The force and effect of this procedural standard is obliterated under these regulations, however, because that very subsection goes on to permit an authorized official simply to allow an authorization to issue by operation of law, or even to affirmatively issue an authorization before completing his or her investigation, and subsequently revoke authorization for any reason which would have warranted a timely denial. The authorized official is thus able to effect untimely denials as easily as timely ones. Untimely denials, however, may impose serious difficulties and burdens because applicant and others may have already acted in reliance on the issuance of the authorization. Indeed, in the case of an event like a "Rainbow Gathering," many thousands of individuals may have arrived at a remote site in a National Forest before an authorized official gets around to finding a reason to deny an authorization.

44. Defendant USFS' administrative regulations governing noncommercial group use authorizations also lack constitutionally required procedural safeguards because Section 251.54(2) purports to permit an effective denial of a noncommercial group use authorization for an expressive or religious activity, such as an "Annual Rainbow Gathering" or one of the numerous "Regional Rainbow Gatherings," by administrative action alone, even if USFS or United States does not go to court to restrain such a use. In providing administrative denial of such an authorization constitutes final agency action subject to immediate judicial review, the regulations purport to place the burden of seeking judicial review of any denial upon the applicant. This burden is constitutionally impermissible, however, where there is a danger applicant will simply forego seeking judicial review in favor of trying to obtain another authorization for different expression or for similar expression in a different location. There are, for instance numerous "Regional Rainbow Gatherings" during every single year, and a potential gatherer faced with an authorization denial might decide to try for authorization in another region rather than initiate federal court review of a particular denial. This decision would deprive those in the original region who lack time and resources to travel to more distant gatherings of benefits of an accessible gathering which, if the unreviewed administrative denial is erroneous, should have occurred. For this reason, full procedural requirements for prior restraints are constitutionally required here, including the requirement that a government official denying a license required in advance of expression or religious exercise go to court to restrain expression rather than rest solely on his or her administrative decision.

45. For reasons specified in paragraphs 42 through 44 of this count, the requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint upon presumptively protected expression and religious practice. The challenged application and authorization requirements thus violate the rights of Plaintiffs secured to them by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and they are, for that reason void and unenforceable.

46. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to attempt to enforce against Plaintiffs, and those with whom they gather, a requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest. Against these continuing enforcement efforts, Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and are entitled to equitable relief from this Court

WHEREFORE each of the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court award to them and against Defendants:

A. A declaratory judgment that Defendant USFS' administrative regulations requiring a noncommercial group use authorization issued prior to commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and are, for that reason, void and unenforceable; and

B. A permanent, and if necessary a temporary and preliminary, injunction restraining each Defendant and other officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys of Defendant USFS, and others acting in concert with any Defendants, from enforcing, in any manner, including but not limited to issuing citations or arresting Plaintiffs or others, any requirement a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest; and

C. Their costs in this litigation together with their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 2412(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and

D. Such other and further relief on their behalf as this Court shall deem just and proper.

Count IV - Strict Scrutiny

47. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 of this complaint into this count 4 as if fully restated herein.

48. The administrative regulations promulgated by the Defendant USFS to regulate noncommercial group uses on National Forest lands were deliberately designed to require special USFS authorization issue before presumptively protected expression and religious practice can occur in the National Forests, which have historically provided a public forum for both expression and religious worship. The express requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of the applicant was specifically intended to impose upon the applicant for and holder of such authorizations, which in the view of the Defendant USFS must be "the group" conducting the authorized noncommercial group use, a broad vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of the participants and spectators present during the use. In addition, this requirement was specifically intended effectively to bind all participants and spectators to the terms and conditions contained in the authorizations. The imposition upon a group or other expressive association of individuals of a collective vicarious liability for the acts of each and every individual who may associate him- or herself in a common or concerted expressive or religious activity impermissibly chills the willingness of both groups and individuals to engage in expressive activities with others who may not be personally known to them, and thereby deprives such groups and individuals of the Constitutionally guaranteed benefits of common action and association with others in furtherance of their expressive and religious efforts. Since the challenged signature requirement is necessary only if it is intended to impose upon "the group" a collective vicarious liability which the law would not impose in the absence of a signed authorization, the requirement impermissibly burdens presumptively protected expression and religious practice. Since the Government lacks any compelling interest in imposing collective vicarious liabilities in addition to those already imposed by law, and since the challenged signature requirement is not necessary to serve any legitimately compelling public interest which cannot be served by measures which are less restrictive of expression and religious worship, it is violative of the rights secured Plaintiffs by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is, for that reason void and unenforceable.

49. Defendant USFS expressly contemplated these regulations apply to the "Rainbow Gatherings" attended by Plaintiffs and others. In particular, the requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of the applicant was and is targeted at the Plaintiffs and others who have attended and who will in the future attend "Rainbow Gatherings." The challenged signature requirement was designed effectively to prevent future "Rainbow Gatherings," and it has been repeatedly used to trigger law enforcement activities which have invaded and disrupted the peace and dignity of the gatherings. Government regulation of expression which is aimed at the content of expression or which targets and differentially burdens disfavored speakers, or which retaliates for past expression and other constitutionally protected activities, such as litigation against the government, is constitutionally impermissible unless that regulation is necessary to serve a compelling public interest which cannot be served by any regulation which is less restrictive of expression.

50. On information and belief, the Defendant USFS, particularly some of its law enforcement personnel, disfavors those, such as the Plaintiffs, who attend "Rainbow Gatherings" for several reasons. First, many of the gatherers hold and regularly express views which are opposed to those held by employees of the USFS, including, but not limited to, views on the inappropriate conduct of USFS law enforcement officers within the National Forests. Second, some within the USFS disfavor those who attend "Rainbow Gatherings" because of the fact that gatherers have twice succeeded in invalidating USFS regulations as a result of federal court litigation in 1985 and 1988. Finally, some within the USFS disfavor gatherers because of their insistence on participating in gatherings on the basis of voluntary consensus and on building and maintaining, at each gathering, a new intentional, consensual community.

51. The unusual requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of the applicant, as well as the USFS's administrative insistence, unsupported by the language of its own regulations, that the applicant for such an authorization must be the group itself, are, in fact, targeted at the religious and political nature of the voluntary, consensual, and ofttimes spontaneous form of participation. USFS personnel have long been aware of the inability of individual gatherers to bind one another without their consent, and many resource management personnel within USFS have developed ways of successfully cooperating with gatherers even in light of this circumstance. Others in the USFS, however, have flatly refused to consider that this is possible. In promulgating the current regulations, for example, Defendant USFS failed to take account of the demonstrated fact that a large number of individual gatherers commit themselves to very substantial and successful clean-up efforts after each gathering; Altogether failing to establish why every one of the government's legitimate interests are not effectively served. Indeed, while it pointed out some minor clean-up oversights, Defendant USFS did not ultimately conclude that the "Rainbow Gatherings" have generally had any lasting adverse impact at all on National Forest land. Instead, USFS simply rejected the politics of the events known as "Rainbow Gatherings" by concluding, without support or analysis, that it must impose some undefined collective responsibility on a "group" as an entity. That is the only purpose uniquely served by the challenged signature requirement. In rejecting ways to protect its legitimate interests other than the authorization signature requirement - ways which are less antithetical to the gatherers known views and therefore less restrictive of the gatherers expressive and religious activities - Defendant USFS simply decided to promulgate an authorization requirement which it knew the gatherers could not meet.

52. For the reasons specified in paragraphs 49 through 51 of this count, the requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest is unconstitutionally targeted at those, such as Plaintiffs who attend "Rainbow Gatherings." Since it is unsupported by any compelling governmental objective which cannot be served by measures which are less restrictive of the gatherers' expression and religious practice, the challenged signature requirement violates the rights of the Plaintiffs secured to them by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is, for that reason void and unenforceable.

53. Unless restrained by this Court, the Defendants, and each of them, will continue to attempt to enforce against the Plaintiffs and those with whom they gather a requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant group before it can be issued by the Defendant USFS to authorize any "Rainbow Gathering" on National Forest land. Against these continuing enforcement efforts, the Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and they are entitled to equitable relief from this Court.

WHEREFORE each of the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court award to them and against each of the Defendants:

A. A declaratory judgment that the Defendant USFS's administrative regulations requiring that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of an applicant group before one can be issued is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that it is, for that reason, void and unenforceable; and

B. A permanent, and if necessary a temporary and preliminary, injunction restraining each of the Defendants and the other officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys of the Defendant USFS, and others acting in concert with any of the Defendants, from enforcing, in any manner, including but not limited to issuing citations or arresting the Plaintiffs or others, any requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization be signed by or on behalf of a group applicant before it can be issued or that an application for such an authorization designate a person or persons who will sign such an authorization by or on behalf of a group applicant; and

C. Their costs in this litigation together with their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 2412(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and

D. Such other and further relief on their behalf as this Court shall deem just and proper.

Count V - Insufficient Notice of Rulemaking

54. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 28 of this complaint into this count 5 as if fully restated herein.

55. When it undertook to propose and consider its current administrative regulations governing noncommercial group uses in the National Forests, Defendant USFS was required under Section 553(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code to publish Notice of its proposals and of the basis for them in the Federal Register because not all of the persons subject to these regulations were personally served with notice or actually notified in accordance with law. As part of its notice, Defendant USFS was required to include, reveal, or refer to information not generally published but known to it which directly bears upon the proposed regulations and which would be useful to those who comment on the proposed rules.

56. For many years, detailed reports, known at least informally as "Rainbow Reports" have circulated among USFS personnel and a few other interested parties. The "Rainbow Reports" generally evaluate, at least from the perspective of their author or authors, virtually every aspect of the "Annual Rainbow Gatherings" of concern to the Defendant USFS and its personnel. On information and belief, the Defendant USFS prepares, or expressly authorizes and provides for the preparation of, these "Rainbow Reports." The "Rainbow Reports" are not formally published or otherwise broadly released to the general public, and they were likely altogether unknown to some individuals who commented on the proposed rules which became the regulations at issue here. An examination of the "Rainbow Reports" would have revealed to many commentators a basis for alternative regulations to those which were proposed and adopted, which alternatives, such as the use of "Operating Plans," are substantially less disruptive of the processes developed to conduct "Rainbow Gatherings."

57. Because of their unfamiliarity with the "Rainbow Reports," many who commented on the proposed rules which became the regulations at issue here lacked a basis for evaluating and commenting upon the decisions of the USFS which resulted in the proposed rules, and they were thereby deprive of the full benefits of the notice and comment procedures established by the Administrative Procedure Act. In addition, those persons, such as the Plaintiffs, who are now subject to the USFS administrative regulations were deprived of the benefits which other commentators could have brought to the comment and review process had they been fully informed as required by law. For this reason, the failure by the Defendant USFS to include, reveal, or refer to the "Rainbow Reports" in the May 6, 1993 Notice of proposed rulemaking which it published in the Federal Register violated Section 553(b)'s notice requirement. For this reason, the USFS regulations governing noncommercial group uses in the National Forests are, as the USFS amended them on August 30, 1995, void and unenforceable.

58. These actions were taken not in accordance with law, without observance of procedure required by law, and are arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA. 5 U.S.C. 706.

59. Unless restrained by this Court, the Defendants, and each of them, will continue to attempt to enforce against the Plaintiffs and those with whom they gather a requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest. Against these continuing enforcement efforts, Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and they are entitled to equitable relief from this Court.

WHEREFORE each of the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court award to them and against each of the Defendants:

A. A declaratory judgment that the Defendant USFS's administrative regulations requiring that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest are, as amended on August 30, 1995, void and unenforceable; and

B. A permanent, and if necessary a temporary and preliminary, injunction restraining each of the Defendants and the other officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys of the Defendant USFS, and others acting in concert with any of the Defendants, from enforcing, in any manner, including but not limited to issuing citations or arresting the Plaintiffs or others, any requirement that a noncommercial group use authorization issue prior to the commencement of a "Rainbow Gathering" in a National Forest; and

C. Their costs in this litigation together with their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 2412(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and

D. Such other and further relief on their behalf as this Court shall deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted April 23, 1998,

BRIAN MICHAELS and BARRY ADAMS,

By:_______________________________________

Brian Michaels, Esq.

ALEXIS BLACK, CARLA NEWBRE,
BRUCE (JOHN) JOHNSON and SUSAN BERNSTEIN,

 

By:_______________________________________
Reed Lee, Esq.

 

and:_______________________________________

Marianne Dugan, Esq.