Motion to dismiss - Osceola, March 1996

The "Motion to dismiss" requires several associated papers, so here's the table of contents.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Owing to my indigence, I, William Thomas, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915, and the appropriate Rules of this Court, hereby move this honorable Court for leave to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. An Affidavit of Indigency accompanies this motion. For the Court's convenience a proposed Order is attached.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March, 1996,

William Thomas, pro se
P.O. Box 27217
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

DECLARATION OF INDIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, William Thomas, declare under penalty of perjury that I am seek to Intervene in the above entitled action, and:

  1. Because of my poverty, I am unable to pay any cost related to this case.
  2. I am not presently employed in any enterprise which returns me a financial recompense, and I have taken a vow of poverty for religious reasons.
  3. During the past thirteen years I have not received any money from business, profession or form of self-employment, rent payments,interest dividends, pensions, annuities, life insurance payments, gifts or inheritances. The only money I have received during the past thirteen years has been in the form of small unsolicited donations, all of which has been spent on literature and other supplies in connection with my communicative activities.
  4. I have no money in a checking or savings accounts.
  5. I own no real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property.
  6. I have no dependents. Under penalty of perjury, this 15th day of March, 1996,
William Thomas, pro se
P.O. Box 27217
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Motion For Leave To Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and the Declaration in support thereof, submitted by Intervener William Thomas,= it appearing the Intervener has shown good cause, this ______ day of= _____________, 1996, plaintiff's motion be, and hereby is GRANTED.

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A DEFENDANT

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), William Thomas moves for leave to intervene in this action, in order to assert the defenses set forth in his proposed Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, a copy of which is hereto attached, on the grounds that he is presently residing within the legal jurisdiction of the United States of America, by virtue of his situation, if granted, the prayer for this Court to, "(d)eclare that plaintiff's group use regulations, 36 C.F.R. 6 251(b) comply with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and are otherwise legally valid," would directly and adversely affect Thomas' interest in well-established constitutional rights guaranteed under the very First Amendment, from which the complaint seeks relief.

Moreover, the Complaint alleges, "The "Rainbow Guide of 1995, Summer Edition' indicates that the Forest Service group use regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Attachment 1." ( Id. para. 22), and Thomas' address and phone number appears under the unconstitutional allegations of which the Forest Service complains (Plaintiff's Attachment 1, inside rear cover, compare, Declaration of William Thomas, filed this date), wherefor, plaintiff is likely to attempt to hold Thomas personally liable under plaintiffs' claim for relief (D). the page of plaintiff's Attachment 1, as such Thomas has a defense to plaintiff's claim presenting both questions of law and of fact which are common to the main action.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March, 1996,

William Thomas, pro se
P.O. Box 27217
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby state that, on March 15, 1996, I served copies of the foregoing Motion to Intervene as a Defendant, by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon the office of

REGINALD LUSTER
Assistant United States Attorney
200 West Forsythe Street, Suite 700
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
Florida Bar No. 075 0069

THOMAS W. MILLET
ANJALI A. ASHLEY
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
801 E Street, N.W.. Room 1016

Leslie Lagmarcino
Officer of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Agriculture
13th & Constitution, S.W.
Washington, D.C.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM THOMAS

I, William Thomas, in support of my motions to Intervene in and Dismiss the above entitled case, submitted herewith, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11, or such appropriate authority, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, that the following is a true and accurate representation of my beliefs and actions:

  1. My religion is devotion to pursuit of Truth, Justice, Freedom and Equality, which I believe to be "the things of the Kingdom of Heaven." Luke, 12: 31; Matthew 6: 33; John, 18: 36.
  2. I believe that through reason, thought, and expression humanity can draw closer to understanding the ways of God. Isaiah 1: 18.
  3. Based on my belief in a God of reason, the most significant exercise of my religion is to assemble fellow seekers of Truth, Justice, Freedom and Equality. Matthew 18: 20; Acts 2: 44.
  4. My association with the Rainbow Family began and has continued as a result of the regulatory scheme that culminated in the amendments to 36 CFR 251 and 261, which are the subject of this suit. In my opinion these regulations are a serious threat to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, and, as such, constitute an insult to the principles of my devotion (supra, =B6 1), and those "self evident truths" upon which this nation was founded.
  5. My involvement in the aforesaid scheme has consisted in assembling and disseminating information regarding the procedure of the scheme to interested individuals.
  6. As a result of my efforts to prevent the Forest Service from criminalizing the ancient right of free assembly on public lands, .my address, P.O. Box 27217, Washington, and telephone number 202-462-0757 appears under the constitutional opinions relied upon on the Complaint, i.e.: "The 'Rainbow Guide for 1995, Summer Edition' indicates that the forest Service group use regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Attachment 1." Complaint, =B6 22.
  7. Owing to the intimate association of my personal address and telephone number with the legal opinions of which plaintiff complains, considering also that plaintiffs ask the Court to "Order the defendants to take such affirmative actions as to provide notice of the injunction to Rainbow Family members inform all means of available public and private media and to inform all members of the Rainbow Family that a violation of the injunction is punishable by contempt of this court," my personal interests are imperiled by plaintiff's action.
  8. A federal court determination as to whether a federal regulation, applicable to all federal forests in the United States, does, or does not, "comply with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and (is) otherwise legally valid," will seriously affect my personal interests.
  9. Although page 3 of Complaint Attachment 1 states, "If you have a belly button, you can be a Rainbow," notwithstanding the fact that I have a belly button, I am not representing myself as a member of the Rainbow Family, but only as an individual concerned with freedom of thought, expression and assembly.
  10. I certainly have no authority, nor can I honestly profess, to represent any interests the which purported "Rainbow Family class" may, or may not, have.
  11. I reaffirm, under penalty of perjury, and applicable statutes, that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and recollection.
William Thomas March 15, 1996

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant intervener, William Thomas, hereby moves, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, and because plaintiff lacks standing, that the Complaint in this matter be dismissed, with prejudice.

INTRODUCTION

On or about February 15, 1996 plaintiff filed suit seeking "a declaratory judgment that United States Department of Agriculture regulations concerning noncommercial group uses of the national forests, are valid under the United States constitution. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction against the Defendants from violating the regulations at issue." Complaint, =B6 1. RULE 23 Although, "(p)laintiff brings this suit against the Rainbow Family as a defendant class" (Complaint, =B6 6),. plaintiff only purports. "On information and belief, the individual defendants are members of the Rainbow Family (also known as, inter alia, the Rainbow Nation. the Rainbow Family of Living Light, and the Gathering of Tribes, the Rainbow Family Vision Council, the Rainbow Family Tribal Council, and the Rainbow Family Scout Council), a loosely-knit organization of persons who gather together in the national forests to Celebrate peace and harmony with nature and =B7with one another." Complaint, =B6 4.

The "named" defendants are not typical of any class; and represent only themselves. As individuals, they can not protect the interests of the named "Defendant Class." On the contrary, plaintiff only offers the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition." Complaint, =B6 22 and Attachment 1.

Plaintiff does not specify that the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition" -- the only purported link between the Complaint, "the class," and reality, -- lists any of the "named defendants." As plaintiff has gone to the trouble of affixing the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition," to the Complaint, at a minimum, plaintiff should have taken the obvious step of serving the members of the purported class.

At worst, the Complaint alleges, that the named defendants were part of a group "who gather(ed) together in the national forests to celebrate peace and harmony with nature and =B7with one another." Assuming that allegation is true, and construing it in a light most favorable to plaintiff, any personnel association of the named defendants is at best a connection of various spiritual beliefs subject to protection under the Freedom of Religion Act of 1993.

While it is certainly true that "information and belief" might lead one to the good faith conclusion that the moon is made of cream cheese, Rule 23 requires that "representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The Complaint is affixed to the "Rainbow Family Guide 1995, Summer Edition," however, it offers no support for an assumption that the "named defendants" are members of the asserted "Rainbow Family class," nor that the named defendants would fairly or adequately protect the interests of "The Rainbow Family. a/k/a Rainbow Nation, aka Rainbow Family of Living Light, a/k/a Gathering of Tribes, the Rainbow Family Vision Council, the Rainbow Family Tribal Council, the Rainbow Family Council, (or) unknown Members"

PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS COMPLAINT

This honorable Court lacks jurisdiction because whatever controversy may have existed is now moot.

Amazingly, perhaps, in its brief Factual Background section (=B6=B6 16= -23) the Complaint bemoans nothing more than the facts that

This is just not a "complaint" that affords any judicial remedy. "The doctrine of standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), which itself "defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded," Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It has been established by a long line of cases that a party seeking to invoke a federal court's *2302 jurisdiction must demonstrate three things: Plaintiff's only grievance is that somebody didn't feel that the regulations were constitutionally valid. So, plaintiff decided to ask this Court to declare that their regulations are "constitutionally valid." This Court just should not waste it's precious time resolving a "yes it is/no it isn't" argument of this calibre.

Here, where plaintiff hasn't offered so much "conjectural or hypothetical" (with the possible exception of hurt feelings) injury, much less a "causal relationship between" any "concrete and particularized" injury, it is obvious that plaintiff is merely pestering this honorable Court for a declaration of the variety which the Circuit has recently indicated is inappropriate. "In this case, because no legal remedies are available to plaintiffs a verdict in their favor would do little more than provide them with emotional satisfaction Such satisfaction is not an appropriate remedy under these circumstances. See also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-73, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 1740, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a claim is moot when the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction from a favorable ruling)." Lankford; et al. v. City of Hobart; et. al, 73 F.3d 283, 288 (1996).

ANY ISSUES PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE IMAGINED ARE MOOT

We need not address the merits of plaintiff claims because a claim is moot when the controversy no longer touches "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' in the outcome of the case. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1706, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam)." Lankford; et al. v. City of Hobart; et. al, 73 F.3D 283, 288. ..

The complaint seeks relief for a gathering which allegedly began "in approximately the last week of January or the first week of February, 1996," and, was purported "to run through the week of February 26. 1996. Complaint paragraph, 16.

Plaintiff does not assert that whatever happened ended over two weeks ago. Further, the complaint does not allege that a "gathering" ever before occurred in the Osceola National Forest, nor does it contain a wispy indication that any= similar "gathering" is likely ever to happen there again. Yet, in sum, the plaintiff seeks an order to enjoin the "Rainbow Family" from "intentionally and knowingly failing to apply for a special use authorization under 36 C.F.R. =A7 251" Complaint, =B6 25, COUNT I (the only Count).

These distinctions are particularly significant in a case like this, where plaintiff is seeking a declaration that "a ... regulations concerning noncommercial group uses of the national forests, are valid under the United States Constitution." Consistently over the years, the Supreme Court has adhered to a strict rule regarding decisions on constitutional issues. "(C)onstitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined ... in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947). the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation ... it is necessary to do so to preserve the rights of the parties" Coffman v. Breeze, 323 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1945). Courts are "bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied." New York and Philadelphis S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).

Hence, since there is no "live controversy," the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render what, on either the injunctive or the declaratory relief sought, would amount to an advisory opinion. See, Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (1979); Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. App. D.C. 306, 889 F.2d 1139,1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1989). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the Complaint in this matter should be dismissed, with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March, 1996,

William Thomas, Defendant Intervenor, pro se
P.O. Box 27217
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Action
v.
Case Number 96- 183

THE RAINBOW FAMILY, et al.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on this 15th day of March, 1996, service of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss, and a Declaration of William Thomas has been made by mailing a copies thereof, first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:

Reginald Luster
Assistant United States Attorney
200 West Forsyth Street, Suite 700
Jacksonville, Florida 32201

THOMAS W. MILLET
ANJALI A. ASHLEY
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
801 E Street, N.W.. Room 1016

Leslie Lagmarcino
Officer of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Agriculture
13th & Constitution, S.W.
Washington, D.C.